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married women. The Canadian federal tax reform of 1988 replaced the spousal exemption with a non-
refundable tax credit. This reduced the dependence of a low income married woman’s effective marginal 
tax rate on the effective marginal tax rate of her husband. Using difference-in-difference estimators, I 
compare the labour supply of women married to higher income husbands (the "treatment" group) and the 
labour supply of women married to lower income husbands (the "control" group). The treatment group 
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show that the tax reform significantly increased the total annual working hours of women married to higher 
income husbands (relative to women married to lower income husbands). 
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1. Introduction   
The effect of income taxes on labour supply is a question of substantial interest to 
both policy makers and academics. Canadian income tax rates changed considerably 
during the late 80’s and early 90’s; however, the effects of Canadian personal income tax 
reforms on labour supply have not been widely studied, particularly in comparison to 
personal income tax reforms in the US.
1 This paper studies the effect of Canadian tax 
reform in 1988 on the labour supply of married women and places those effects in the 
context of studies of the labour supply of married women in the US.   
I use the Canadian federal tax reform in 1988 as a natural experiment to examine 
tax effects on the labour supply of low income married women in Canada. There are two 
tax-filing systems for married women in Canada. Married women who have an income 
which is below the taxable level are allowed to file tax returns jointly with their spouses 
(for the rest of this study, I refer to these women as dependent-married women), while 
married women who have a taxable level of income file separate tax returns. 
McCaffery in his book Taxing Women (1997), examines the effects of taxation on 
the labour decisions of women in the US, and argues that the US tax system distorts the 
labour decisions of women in the US. The taxation unit in the US is a household; 
therefore, if women are treated as secondary earners in the family, the first dollar of 
earnings by married women is effectively subject to high marginal tax rates determined 
                                                 
1 The 1980's tax reform in the US has been richly studied. Eissa (1995, 1996) analyzes labour supply of 
married women. Austin and Carroll (1999) study the effect of income tax on household income. Also 
Gruber and Saez (2000) estimate the tax price elasticity of taxable income as does Feldstein (1995).    
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by their husband’s income, and the joint filing system of married women with their 
spouses consequently limits married women’s entry into the labour force.
2 
Given this point of view, the Canadian tax reform of 1988 is interesting because it 
reduced the correlation between the husband’s marginal income tax rate and the 
dependent-married women’s effective marginal income tax rate. The spousal exemption 
(tax deduction) was replaced with a non-refundable tax credit, and the value of this credit 
is less dependent on the marginal tax rate of the husband.  
In this study, I employ a difference-in-difference estimation strategy to study the 
impact of the 1988 federal tax reform on the labour supply of married women. Among US 
studies of married women’s labour supply, Eissa (1995) uses the difference-in-difference 
estimation method, treating the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) as a natural 
experiment.  She focuses particularly on the labour supply of women married to high 
income husbands. The TRA86 reduced the number of tax brackets from fourteen to two. 
The top marginal tax rate was lowered from 50 percent to 28 percent, and the marginal 
tax rates of lower brackets were changed relatively less. Her study compares the changes 
in labour supply of women married to higher income husbands to the changes in labour 
supply of women married to lower income husbands. She finds that TRA86 significantly 
increased the  labour supply of women married to higher income husbands relative to the 
                                                 
2 Empirical studies of the labour supply of married women (including Eissa) commonly define the wife's 
labour supply conditional on the husband's income and this is based on the neoclassical model (this model is 
also known as the chauvinist model). Under this model a married woman maximizes her utility function 
defined over consumption and leisure, subject to both a budget constraint that total consumption equals total 
income (earned income and unearned income), and a time constraint of total hours available. Unearned 
income for a married woman includes her husband’s earned income, which is affected by the husband’s 
labour supply behaviour. Consequently, this model, in which a married woman conditions her labour supply 
on her husband’s labour supply decision, makes the wife the secondary earner in the household. However, 
the traditional ‘chauvinistic’ model neglects the potentially important aspect of simultaneous optimization 
by husband and wife. Both the Nash-bargaining model (McElroy and Horney 1981) and the collective 
model (Chiappori 1992, 1988) of household labour supply behaviour use the simultaneous optimization 
approach for household labour supply.     
  3
labour supply of women married to lower income husbands. In addition, Eissa (1996) 
uses the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981 as a natural experiment to examine 
the labour supply of married women. The ERTA reduced marginal tax rates by 23 percent 
within each bracket over a period of three years: by 10 percent in 1982, 10 percent in 
1983 and 5 percent in 1984. For two - earner married couples, ERTA introduced a tax 
deduction equal to 10 percent of the income of the lower earning spouse as long as he or 
she earned less than $30,000. In this second study, she finds weak evidence that the 
labour force participation of upper income married women is responsive to taxes, and no 
significant evidence of an increase in labour supply (annual working hours) of upper 
income married women.  
The difference-in-difference estimation method is distinguished by its ability to 
estimate labour supply responses without relying on knowledge of the exact functional 
form of the tax system (explicitly specifying the functional form of the tax system is 
unnecessary). However, Essia’s studies have been criticized by Heckman (1996), 
Blundell and MaCurdy (1998) and Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998).
3 The main 
criticism is her use of husbands’ income as a “grouping variable” to assign women to 
                                                 
3 Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) develop grouping instrumental variable estimators to estimate labour 
supply models that account for the endogeneity of gross wages and other income, and study how tax policy 
reforms in the UK during the 1980's affected the labour supply of married women. The grouping estimators 
are the extended forms of the differnece-in-differenceestimation method because they allow the 
consideration of more than two time periods. These two methods are very similar in the context of using 
differential changes between groups to control for correlation between unobservable characteristics of 
individuals and treatment effects (tax effects) in estimation. The differencing removes the source of 
endogeneity for treatment effects. Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) explicitly control for the 
endogeneity of post tax wages using grouping instruments; therefore, the differential changes of marginal 
wages between groups reflect both differential growth in real wages between groups and differential 
impacts of the tax reforms on these groups. On the other hand, Eissa does not explicitly include a wage 
variable as a control variable in the differnece-in-differenceestimations of labour supply. Instead, she 
assumes there is no differential growth in real wages between the two groups during the pre and post tax 
reform periods. The key difference between these two studies is the way they define their groups. Eissa uses 
a distribution of the husband’s income as a grouping variable, which is criticized because it is also subject to 
tax changes. Meanwhile, Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) use women’s level of education and age 
cohort as grouping variables, which are exogenous (independent) of tax reforms.    
  4
treatment and control groups. The concern is that the husband’s income is not exogenous 
and may itself respond to the tax reform.  Some women may switch groups (that is, there 
may be changing group composition) as a result of the tax reform, and this leads to biased 
estimates of the effects of the reform on labour supply behaviour. In spite of these 
criticisms I have adopted her identification strategy. Later, I will provide justifications for 
using the husband’s income to determine treatment and control groups in this study.  
In this study I employ data from the Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF) for the years from 1986 to 1991.
4 The SCF is an annual cross sectional data which 
consists of individual, census family, and economic family files. In addition, for the 
purposes of this study, I have developed a simulation model
5 of the effective marginal 
income tax rates of individuals in Canada. Using the information available in the SCF it 
calculates federal and provincial tax liabilities and effective marginal income tax rates for 
single or married male and female taxpayers with or without dependent children. 
With this empirical strategy I find evidence that women married to higher income 
husbands increased their labour supply and labour force participation as a result of the 
Canadian federal tax reform in 1988.  
An outline of the remainder of the chapter is as follows: in section 2, I describe in 
detail the expected impact of the Canadian federal tax reform of 1988 on lower income 
married women’s labour supply in Canada. In section 3, I describe the data that I use and 
explain the identification strategy. In section 4, I present basic difference-in-difference 
results and this is followed by regression adjusted difference-in-difference estimates, 
                                                 
4 The SCF was collected by Statistics Canada from 1970 to 1996 and was a cross sectional data series which 
used a different random sample of individuals each year.  In the mid 1990s, this survey was replaced by the 
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), a longitudinal series which followed the same individuals 
for several years. 
5 Please see the appendix for more details.    
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which control for possible changes over time in the demographic characteristics of the 
treatment and control groups. I conclude this paper in section 5.  
 
2. The Canadian Tax Reform of 1988 and Married 
Women’s Labour Supply. 
The 1988 federal tax reforms in Canada had a particular effect on the effective 
marginal income tax rates of married women. Prior to the reform, there were 10 tax 
brackets in the personal income tax schedule, with rates ranging from 6 to 34 percent. 
This was replaced with a schedule of only 3 brackets, with rates of 17, 26, and 29 
percent.
6 The 1988 federal income tax reform also converted personal exemptions and 
many tax items that were formerly deductible into non-refundable tax credits. For 
example, personal exemptions for a dependent spouse and children were replaced with a 
personal non-refundable tax credit. Prior to 1988, a filing spouse was allowed to claim a 
spousal exemption, which acted to reduce the taxable income of the husband which, in 
turn, was taxed under the bracket related schedule of rates. Under this spousal exemption 
husbands could claim a maximum amount of $3700 in 1987. The exemption however was 
a decreasing function of the spouse’s income in excess of a stated amount. After 1988 this 
spousal exemption was replaced by a non-refundable tax credit. Under the new rules, the 
maximum amount ($850) of the married or equivalent credit was reduced by an amount 
equivalent to 17 percent of the dependent spouse’s net income in excess of $500. This 
credit phased out to zero at an income level of $5500, at which point the dependent 
                                                 
6 However, in the Canadian tax system, effective marginal tax rates are affected by the high-income surtax, 
the various claw backs of refundable tax credits, and transfer payments, so that effectively, the number of 
true tax brackets is larger than three.     
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spouse had to file a separate return. As a result, under the current Canadian tax system, a 
lower-income spouse faces tax rates initially at the lowest bracket rate (17 percent in 
1988). In contrast, under the tax system prior to 1988, the effective marginal tax rate of 
the lower-income spouse was the same as the effective marginal income tax rate of the 
(higher income) tax-filing spouse. For women with high income husbands, this could be 
much higher than 17%.  
Hence, if prior to 1988, the husband’s marginal income tax rate was relatively 
high, his wife’s effective marginal tax rate was considerably reduced by the tax reform. 
On the other hand, if the husband’s marginal income tax rate was relatively low, the 
change in his wife’s effective marginal income tax rate after tax reform in 1988 was 
insignificant. I, therefore, identify the impact of the federal tax reform in 1988 on the 
labour supply decisions of dependent-married women as the difference between the 
change in labour supply of women who face large reductions in the effective marginal 
income tax rate (the treatment group) and the change in labour supply of women who face 
relatively small reductions in the effective marginal income tax rate (the control group).  
In figure A.1, I present average simulated effective marginal income tax rates of 
working married women in the SCF during the reference years 1986 and 1990; the curve 
is calculated using income data from the SCF, individual effective marginal tax rates from 
my tax simulation program, and locally linear regression.  The hump in the lower income 
range present in the 1986 graph shows that before the federal tax reform in 1988, women 
with very low income (dependent-married women) were subject to high effective 
marginal tax rates. In later years, this hump is absent because the tax reform reduced the    
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association between dependent women’s effective marginal tax rates and those of their 
higher income husbands.  
 
3. Data and identification strategy.  
I use data from the Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for the survey 
years from 1986 to 1987, and from 1990 to 1991 (the actual reference years are from 
1985 to 1986, and from 1989 to 1990). I draw the sample from the census family files and 
individual files of the SCF. First, I select married women from the census families, whose 
ages are between 20 and 64 and whose husband is present
7 and is a paid employee in the 
reference years. I exclude women who are self employed, ill or disabled, attending school, 
or whose income is the primary income for the family. Also I exclude women residing in 
Quebec because Quebec imposes its provincial income tax separately. The sample data 
has 22,473 women. The census family files do not contain information on spouses’ 
working hours. Thus, as the next step, I combine individual files from the SCF with the 
census family files using key files provided by Statistics Canada  
For the study, I first need to determine which women are more likely to be 
dependent-married women. A dependent-married woman is identified by her income 
being below the taxable threshold. I observe women’s income in the data so that I can 
identify who might be dependent-married women. However, the composition of this 
group of women is itself changed by changes in tax policy.  Thus, I estimate a simple 
probit model of dependency (with a dependent-married woman being assigned a value 
equal to one) on the observable characteristics of women in the data. I that find the level 
                                                 
7 By present I mean the husband and wife are living in the same household.    
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of education of married women and the number of pre-school children both exhibit 
significant positive effects on the probability that a married women is “dependent” from 
the point of few of tax filing (as described above). Table 1 shows the percentages of 
women in each education group by dependency status. 37% of dependent-married women 
have an education level of less than high school. On the other hand, 50% of the 
independent women have an education level of more than high school. Using these results 
as a guide, I restrict the sample to married women having a level of education of no more 
than high school. My final sample includes 12,719 women. 
I use total income of husbands to select the treatment and the control groups. (In 
the sample, married women’s non-labour earnings are negligible.) In each year, the 
treatment group is made up of married women whose husband’s income is over the 85th 
percentile of husbands’ incomes (for that year). The 1,905 women in this group are 
characterized by having husbands whose total income is in excess of $42,292  (1986 
dollars). Then, I choose the control group in the following manner. First, these women 
must be at a point in the distribution of husbands’ incomes far enough below the high 
income group that their marginal income tax rate does not fall by as much as the marginal 
income tax rates of women in the high income group. Second, these women cannot be so 
far down the husband’s income distribution that they are fundamentally different from 
women in the treatment group in some unobservable way.
8 On the basis of these 
considerations, I chose a control group of women whose husband’s income is between the 
21
st and the 35
th percentile of the husbands’ income distribution. 1,930 women belong to 
this control group, and the average total income of their husband is $ 22,872. The 
                                                 
8 I already exclude women educated more than high school; therefore, there is less variation in unobservable 
characteristics compared to the case using the overall sample of women as in Eissa’s sample data.    
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summary statistics for the two groups are presented in Table 2. Women in the control 
group tend to be younger, less educated, and have more children under age 7. Also they 
tend to work more than the treatment group (both more weeks and hours). 
Conceptually, the following table presents average annual working hours of each 
group before and after the tax reform. 
  Before 1988 tax reform  After 1988 tax reform 
Control group  Hcb H ca 
Treatment group  Htb H ta 
 
The changes in working hours by women married to a higher income husband are (Htb - 
Hta). Part of this change is due to the tax reform, and part is due to extraneous factors such 
as changes in labour demand. The assumption is that women married to a lower income 
husband (the control group) reflect these non-tax factors in the change in working hours, 
given by (Hcb - Hca). Finally, the test that 1988 tax reform increased the labour supply of 
women in the treatment group is a test that (Htb - Hta) - (Hcb - Hca) is greater than zero. In 
other words, I test whether women who faced significant tax rate reductions increased 
working hours more than women who experienced smaller tax rate reductions.  
Regarding the difference-in-difference estimator, there are several concerns 
related to group identification. The first concern raised is finding an exogenous grouping 
variable. In spite of Heckman’s criticisms of Eissa’s approach, which are summarized in 
the previous section, I use the husband’s total income as a grouping variable. There are 
several justifications for using the husband’s income distribution to choose the treatment 
and control groups here. First, in their study of the impact of the 1988 Canadian tax    
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reform,  Sillamaa and Veall (2001) find that taxable income (including capital income) is 
substantially less responsive to tax changes in Canada than in the U.S.
9 Sillamaa and 
Veall (2001) do find evidence of a much higher tax response in self-employment income. 
Thus, I have excluded from my sample those married women having self-employed 
husbands, and have only kept women whose major source of total family income is wages 
and salaries.  
 I use a wide income band from the husbands’ income distribution to choose 
treatment and control groups to reduce the potential chances of changing composition of 
groups (switching groups by women) after tax reform.
10 In addition, the use of a wide 
band of the income distribution for control and treatment groups also gives me enough 
observations in each group to produce precise estimates. 
The second concern regarding the identifying assumptions is that there are no 
contemporary shocks to the relative labour market outcomes over the period of the tax 
reforms. This includes both no relative demand and no relative supply shocks. For 
example, if there is a difference in wage growth between the treatment and control 
groups, the difference-in-difference estimates will be biased. And there is certainly a 
possibility of different growth rates in the wages of higher and lower educated women. 
My sample includes only low-educated women. Therefore, my analysis has less chance of 
                                                 
9 They use similar methods to those applied by Auten and Carroll (1999) in the study of the effects of the 
TRA86 in the US. In contrast to the findings of Sillamaa and Veall, Auten and Carroll find both tax rates 
and non-tax factors appear to have had significant effects on relative income growth in the US during the 
late 1980s. 
10 Also I test using the husband’s education as a grouping variable since individuals with a high level of 
education (more than high school) likely earn higher income, and accordingly have a high marginal tax rate 
in the pre tax reform period. Therefore, I identify dependent-married women who have a high marginal tax 
rate in the pre tax reform period as those having a husband with a higher level of education. However, the 
difference in changes in average marginal tax rates between women married to a higher educated husband 
and women married to a lower educated husband are not statistically significant. One possible reason is the 
smaller number (categories) of level of husband’s education.    
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being biased in this way than Eissa’s studies (1995, 1996),  as she uses a sample which 
includes women of all different levels of education 
The third concern regarding the difference-in-difference estimator is that the 
treatment and the control groups may differ in time trends of either observable or 
unobservable characteristics or both.
11 Any bias due to differential changes in observable 
characteristics between the treatment and control groups is reduced in a regression 
adjusted difference-in-difference approach by controlling for relevant factors (Meyer 
1995).  
Also, in general, the addition of more explanatory variables via a regression 
adjustment will be an efficiency improvement over estimates obtained by a simple 
difference-in-difference approach. Using a regression model framework will tend to 
improve the efficiency of the estimates obtained by this method by reducing residual 
variance (Meyer 1995).  
In the regression framework, I estimate labour force participation and annual total 
working hours. First, I estimate a probit model analyzing the binary choice of whether or 
not to participate in the labour force. Next, I estimate the working hours equation on the 
sample of women, restricted to include only those who are working.  To control for 
sample selection bias in the estimation of the labour supply equation, I include an 
inversed Mills’ ratio calculated from the participation probit. 
12The participation and the 
labour supply equations are specified as:  
                                                 
11 Blundell and MaCurdy (1998) also argue that given the increasing dispersion of incomes and wages 
among all groups during the study period of Eissa (1995), the common time effects (common trends) 
assumption among the unobservable components across the treatment and control groups may not be 
satisfied. 
12 As I have only one tax reform, I effectively have a single instrument, and the selection correction is 
identified by nonlinearities.    
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01 2 3 4 (1 ) ( _ ( _ * ) ) it it i t it P LFP X hdtinc h time hdtinc h time β ββ β β == Φ + + + +  
01 2 3 4 _( _ * ) it it i t it LS X hdtinc h time hdtinc h time α αα α α =+ + + +  
 
where labour force participation (LFP) is a latent variable that equals one if an individual 
is a participant,
13 Xit  is a set of demographic variables including age, age squared, the 
number of preschool children dummies, level of education dummies, and provincial 
dummies. ‘ _ hdtinc h’ is a dummy equal to one for women in the treatment group. Any 
differences in labour supply preferences across the treatment and the control group are 
reflected in the coefficients 2 β  and  2 α , in the labour force participation probit and labour 
supply equation respectively. Both  2 β  and  2 α are expected to be negative, because higher 
income women have more leisure than their lower income counterparts. The variable 
‘time’, is equal to one for the post tax reform period. Its coefficients 3 β  and  3 α are both 
expected to be positive because participation and labour supply are generally increasing 
over time. To test the impact of the federal tax reform of 1988, one only needs to test 
whether dependent-married women with a higher income spouse increased their labour 
supply (relative to women married to a low income spouse) after the federal tax reform. If 
4 β  and  4 α are both positive, then the tax reform had a positive impact on labour force 
participation and labour supply respectively.  This would show that the tax reform’s 
lessening of the joint relationship between the effective marginal income tax rate of 
                                                 
13 This does not include unemployed married women. I redefined the LFP such that the number of working 
weeks in the reference year is at least one week.    
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dependent-married women and of their husbands is a significant factor in a wife’s labour 
supply decision.  
 
4. Results 
  I consider the impact of the Canadian federal income tax reform in 1988 on the 
effective marginal income tax rates and labour supply of each group of dependent-married 
women. Before discussing the results from the regressions, I present the basic difference-
in-difference results. Table 3 presents the average effective federal marginal income tax 
rate
14 for each group. For women in the treatment group, there is an average reduction of 
1.2 percentage points in the effective marginal income tax rate, and for women in the 
control group, there is an average decline of 0.4 percentage points.  
Table 4 reports the basic difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the tax 
reform on both the labour force participation and the labour supply of married women. 
Table 4.a compares the changes in the labour force participation of married women at 
higher income percentiles and married women at lower income percentiles before and 
after the tax reform. There is a significant increase (7.3%) in the labour force participation 
rate for women in the higher income distribution range. In addition, table 4.b and table 4.c 
show the difference-in-difference  results for weeks worked in the reference year and for 
annual total hours worked for employed married women.
15 The relative increases are 1.5 
                                                 
14 Table 3.b. presents the effective federal marginal income tax rate of dependent married women, who are 
identified by their income being below the taxable threshold. The differnece-in-difference of the effective 
marginal tax rate (0.0627) is larger than the one (0.0085) in table 3. 
15 The participation results suggest that more women are entering the labour force during this period. 
Because these women may be different than women in the labour force prior to tax reform, the population 
of working women in pre and post the tax reform may not be directly comparable.    
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weeks
16 and 42.75 hours over the pre and post tax reform period, and the numbers in 
square brackets [ ] show percentage changes between the various treatments. The 
magnitude of labour force participation and labour supply with respect to the tax price 
(the after tax wage) is very large. The percent changes in table 3 and 4 rely on the 
assumption that the relative market wage for the two groups remains constant over this 
period.  
  Turning to the regression results, I first present estimates of the labour force 
participation equation in table 5. As expected, the number of preschool children reduces 
the probability of labour force participation, and more educated women are more likely to 
participate in the labour force. The treatment (married to high-income husbands) dummy 
is significantly negative. The time dummy is positive but not significant.
17 The coefficient 
on the interaction of time and high income is significantly positive at the less than 5% 
significance level. Hence, I find evidence that there is an increase in the labour force 
participation of married women after replacing the spousal exemption (tax deduction) 
with a non-refundable tax credit.  
Table 6 shows the results for annual total hours of work. Having more pre-school 
children significantly reduces the annual total hours worked by married women. By level 
of education, the effect of women’s education on total hours of work is insignificant for 
women having less than a high school level of education. On the other hand, there is a 
significant positive increase in total hours of work for married women with a high school 
level of education. Adding these controls increases both the size and significance of the 
                                                 
16 It is marginally significant only at the 20 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.  
17 There is sustained growth in the labour force participation of Canadian women during the 1970s and 
1980s. For women aged 25-64 the labour force participation rate increased from less than 50 percent in the 
mid 1970s to 70 percent in the late 1980s. Then women’s labour force participation rate remains around 
75% throughout the 1990s (see Beaudry and Lemieux (1999) and Chaykowski and Powell (1999)).     
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interaction coefficient ( _ * hdtinc h time ). The coefficient of the interaction between time 
and high-income husbands is highly significant, and the women in the treatment group 
increased their annual working hours by 192.8 hours relative to the women in the control 
group.
18 Lastly, the coefficient on the inverse Mills’ ratio calculated from the labour force 
participation probit is statistically significant; therefore, the sample selection correction is 
important in annual hours estimates.   
 
5. Conclusions 
  I investigate the labour supply responses of married women using Canadian tax 
reform in 1988.  I use difference-in-difference estimator to examine the impacts of the 
federal tax reform in 1988 on the labour supply of dependent-married women who have 
less than the taxable level of income. The federal tax reform in 1988 is interesting as a 
‘natural experiment’ because it reduced the correlation between the husband’s marginal 
income tax rate and the lower income wife’s effective marginal tax rate by replacing the 
spousal exemption with a non-refundable tax credit. I compare the labour supply of 
women married to higher income husbands and the labour supply of women married to 
lower income husbands, since the (treatment) group of women married to higher income 
husbands experiences larger reduction in the effective marginal tax rate relative to the 
(control) group of women married to lower income husbands due to the tax reform in 
1988. I find a significant increase in labour force participation for women married to 
                                                 
18 I also estimate the equation of annual weeks worked. The coefficient of time is positive, the treatment 
dummy is negative and the interaction between time and treatment is positive, but none of these is 
significant. In terms of the fixed cost, Increasing number of hours given same number of working weeks 
may cost less than increasing number of working weeks given same number of working hours per week.        
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higher income husbands. Also, the results of difference-in-difference regression show that 
total annual working hours of women married to higher income husbands are significantly 
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Table 1. The percentages of women in each education group by dependency 
(joint tax filing) status.  
 




Less than graduated from 
high school 
19.26% 36.69% 
Graduated from high school  30.59%  31.63% 
More than high school  50.16%  31.68% 
Total number of women  14263 (100%)  8210 (100%) 
 
Note: It includes both working and nonworking married women.   
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Table 2. Summary statistics of the groups.  
 
 
  Control group  Treatment group
Age 34.59 37.91
  0.22 0.22
Education 3.05 3.43
  0.02 0.02
Husband’s education  3.51 4.49
  0.04 0.04
Pre-school children  0.72 0.58
  0.02 0.02
Husband’s total income  22872.34 53601.74
  32.45 321.52
Total income   8334.14 10093.05
  158.97 264.58
Total wage  7087.25 9160.80
  154.75 251.79
Weeks worked   30.61 28.61
  0.51 0.54
Weekly usual hours worked  19.37 18.38
  0.41 0.41
Labour force participation  0.74 0.66
   0.01 0.01
Obs 1930 1905
 
Notes: all incomes are in 1986 dollars. Standard errors are in italics.     
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Table 3. Average effective federal marginal income tax rates for the sample. 
 



















1.  Marginal tax rates are calculated conditional on working women.  
2.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
3.  * is not statistically significant (for a two tail test). 
4.  ** is significant at less than 5% significance level (for a two tail test). 
5.  *** is  significant at less than 1% significance level (for a two tail test).  
 
 
Table 3.a. The percent change in the after tax wage. 
 
Group Change  Relative  change 
Control   0.38 %   
Treatment   1.45 %  1.07 % 
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Table 3.b. Average effective federal marginal income tax rates for the 
dependent married women. 
 



















1.  marginal tax rates are calculated conditional on working women.  
2.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
3.  * is not statistically significant (for a two tail test). 
4.  ** is significant at less than 5% significance level (for a two tail test). 
5.  *** is significant at less than 1% significance level (for a two tail test).     
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Table 4. Difference-in-difference estimates 
Table 4.a. Labour force participation  





















Table 4.b. Working weeks in the reference years    
Group  Pre tax reform  Post tax reform  Change  Differential 
change 
Control  40.4901    
(.5647) 






Treatment  41.6750    
(.6111) 










1.  Working weeks are calculated conditional on working women.  
2.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
3.  [ ] is percentage change (percent increase).  
4.  * is not statistically significant (for a two tail test). 
5.  ** is significant at less than 5% significance level (for a two tail test). 
6.  *** is significant at less than 1% significance level (for a two tail test).     
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Table 4.c. Annual total working hours conditional on working women. 





















Table 4.d. Annual total working hours    






















1.  In table 2.4.c, Annual total working hours are calculated conditional on working women. 
2.  In table 2.4.d, Annual total working hours are calculated conditional on all women.  
3.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
4.  [ ] is percentage change (percent increase).  
5.  * is not statistically significant (for a two tail test). 
6.  ** is significant at less than 5% significance level (for a two tail test). 
7.  *** is significant at less than 1% significance level (for a two tail test)    
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Table 5. Labour force participation probit. 
 
Variables   Coef. Std. Err. 
Age 0.0175 0.0184 
Age
2  -0.0004*** 0.0002 
one pre-school child   -0.3350* 0.0588 
two pre-school children   -0.6831* 0.0684 
Education  
   grade 9-10  0.4509* 0.0880 
   grade 11-13 not graduate  0.6610* 0.0954 
   grade 11-13 graduate  0.6808* 0.0828 
Province    
   NFLD  -0.4820* 0.0929 
   PEI  -0.0651 0.1428 
   NS  -0.3848* 0.0946 
   NB  -0.3139* 0.0870 
   MAN  -0.1380 0.0899 
   SASK  -0.1544*** 0.0855 
   ALTA  -0.1653** 0.0676 
   BC  -0.2540* 0.0744 
Time 0.0105 0.0647 
Higher income   -0.4437* 0.0624 
Higher income * Time  0.2151** 0.0891 
Constant 0.4589 0.3674 
Obs 3835    
 
Note: 
1.          * is significant at less than 1% significance level. 
2.       ** is significant at less than 5% significance level. 
3.    *** is significant at less than 10% significance level.    
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Table 6.  2SLS of Annual total working hours.  
 
Variables   Coef. Std. Err. 
Age 4.9036 14.8773 
Age
2   -0.2162 0.2276 
one pre-school child   -401.9745* 112.5450 
two pre-school children   -704.0824* 239.3432 
Education   
   grade 9-10  305.3159 199.6253 
   grade 11-13 not graduate  384.6639 266.2753 
   grade 11-13 graduate  528.6390*** 270.2486 
Province      
   NFLD  -444.9371** 185.4826 
   PEI  -93.1342 83.8841 
   NS  -298.3100** 149.1454 
   NB  -376.0407* 120.3510 
   MAN  -195.7731* 72.1197 
   SASK  -152.5111** 74.4554 
   ALTA  -178.8472** 69.8978 
   BC  -300.3208* 97.6202 
Time 41.3197 40.2629 
Higher income   -381.7452** 158.9480 
Higher income * Time  192.8356** 96.3451 
Inverse_Mills 1351.9820*** 722.5898 
Constant 1031.5780*** 531.1278 
Obs 2200    
 
Note: 
1.          * is significant at less than 1% significance level. 
2.       ** is significant at less than 5% significance level. 




Taxpayers' effective marginal income tax rates differ from their statutory marginal 
income tax rates. Macnaughton, Matthews and Pittman (1998)
19 report that in Canada, 
there are nineteen separate sources of differences between effective and statutory 
marginal tax rates, and 56 percent of the population experiences at least some difference 
between effective and statutory marginal tax rates. More than one-fifth of the population 
has at least a ten percentage point difference between the effective and statutory tax rates. 
Also, they mention that high effective tax rates are concentrated in the lowest federal 
statutory rate bracket (17 percent). In fact more taxpayers with effective rates above 45 
percent come from this bracket than from the supposedly top bracket of 31.32 percent. 
For the purpose of my study, I have developed a simulation model (‘Smltax’) 
calculating the effective marginal income tax rates in Canada using STATA. This 
simulation model is distinguished from a similar application by Statscan (SPSD/M) 
because of its ability to calculate the effective marginal tax rates of married women, 
including and especially, dependent tax filing spouses. This program is easy to use for 
calculating effective marginal tax rates using several variables provided in most Canadian 
survey micro data sets with labour supply information. I developed this program based on 
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data files but it is also compatible for use with 
other micro data sets such as the Family Expenditure Survey (FAMEX),
20 and the Survey 
of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID).
21 
                                                 
19 Macnaughton, Matthews and Pittman (1998) use the Social Policy Simulation Database and Model 
(SPSD/M), which is a database of personal income tax returns and other financial data on individuals which 
contains a software facility enabling the user to simulate the revenue and income distribution effects of 
changes to tax laws and provincial and federal social programs such as employment insurance. However, to 
protect confidentiality, the individuals represented on the SPSD/M are synthetic in the sense that they are 
composites of several similar individuals. Since it has not been originally designed for calculating marginal 
tax rates, there are certain difficulties associated with calculating the effective marginal tax rates. In 
addition, this simulation model is not comparable with other micro survey data. 
20 FAMEX contains reported data by survey respondents like the SCF; therefore, all information (variables) 
are from corresponding questions on the survey. There are several tax related variables in FAMEX: income 
before tax, income after tax, personal taxes (this is income tax in each year) and provincial tax credits.  
21 In the SLID there are two sources of income data, which depend on each respondent’s preferences. 
Respondents can either report income sources during the interview or grant their permission for Statistics 
Canada to access their tax file data from Revenue Canada for purposes of the survey. In effect, well over 
half of SLID’s income data come directly from Revenue Canada (Statistics Canada Working paper No. 94-
11 “The Use of Tax File Data in the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics: Summary Report”). In SLID,    
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Smltax calculates federal and provincial tax liabilities and effective marginal 
income tax rates for single male and female taxpayers with or without children, as well as 
for married male and female taxpayers with or without children. These computations 
reflect the provisions of the federal and provincial income tax legislation as follows: 
1)  The Federal and Provincial Tax payable are computed using the rate schedules 
published in “The National Finances” and “Preparing your income tax returns”. 
2)  Total income is assumed to be from either Canadian employment or Canadian 
taxable government transfers. Deductions are taken for CPP or QPP and UI 
premiums (credits are used where applicable). 
3)  For the Federal Child Tax Credit, family total income is defined as respondents' 
total income plus their spouses’ total income. And I assume that children under 16 
(or 18 - whichever information is available in the data: SCF) have no income; 
therefore, the full tax savings is assigned to these children. 
4)  Because a refundable sales tax credit was introduced in 1986 and the GST credit 
was introduced in 1991, these values were reflected in the tax simulation model. 
5)  Provincial rates are levied as a percentage of federal rates with special flat taxes, 
surtaxes and low income deductions/reductions. In addition, certain tax credits 
issued by the provinces such as Cost Of Living Credits, and Provincial Sales Tax 
Credits are reflected in the program’s calculations. 
There are certain limitations of the model since it cannot cover all the phase out of 
the tax under each family specific circumstance. In particular, it is not suitable for 
calculating marginal tax rates of self-employers and those whose main income source is 
capital income. Therefore, my tax simulation is more suitable for calculating effective 
marginal tax rates of taxpayers whose main income source is employment income (wage 
and salaries).  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
there are various variables related to income and tax information such as income tax (federal +provincial), 
federal income tax, provincial income tax, CPP/QPP, Child Tax Benefit, GST, etc. Also, when non-
response occurs, certain types of data are imputed. Federal and provincial taxes payable are imputed using 
linear regression analysis, and the Child Tax Benefit and GST are imputed based on respondents’ 
characteristics.    
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Figure A.1. The effective marginal income tax rates of working married women in Canada.
 22 
 































                                                 
22 Income is in 1992 dollars.    
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Table A.1. Husband’s total average income tax rates for the sample. 
 




.1784     
(.0014) 
-.0064
***    
(.0023) 
 
Treatment  .2580     
(.0023) 
.2774    
(.0020) 
-.0194
***     
(.0030) 
.0129




1.  Average tax rates are calculated conditional on working women.  
2.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
3.  *** is significant at less than 1% significance level (for a two tail test).  
 
 